Nick Griffin and David Irving have been invited to talk at the Oxford Union in a ‘Free Speech Forum’. A number of groups have condemned this, calling for the invitations to be withdrawn. A significant proportion in the Oxford student community believe this to be a direct attack on free speech – the very issue which the debate was to discuss. This piece explains why this latter view is mistaken.
Logic
Let us begin with a simple logical demonstration of this assertion.
- We can agree that not inviting any given individual to speak at the Union is not equivalent to denying them free speech, since under no meaningful definition does free speech imply being able to speak in any possible forum (national television, the G8 summit, the Oxford Union) at one’s choosing.
- By implication, saying that an individual should not be invited to the Union and acting upon this is not equivalent to denying them their right to free speech. QED.
A simple analogy: An individual records a video of himself expressing views on a wide variety of issues . He later gratuitously murders a dozen people. Upon his arrest the video is obtained by media agencies. Is it a violation of his free speech to argue that the video should not be broadcast?
Experience of Censorship
Even agreeing that withdrawing the invitations is not equivalent to an attack on free speech, this is not in itself a reason for them to be withdrawn. The Union president and others have argued that Irving and Griffin have experience of censorship and this means that they will make an important contribution to the debate. It is fundamentally disagreement with this argument that motivates those demanding the withdrawal of the invitations. A formulation of the argument is as follows.
It is true that Griffin and Irving have experience of censorship: Irving was jailed for holocaust denialism in Austria; Griffin has a conviction in Britain for producing a publication that incited racial hatred . In fact, this is the only thing that qualifies both Irving and Griffin to talk about free speech. From their point of view the fact that this has led to their censorship is simply incidental. It should not be merely incidental for us however.
Assuming that we can agree on certain moral principles (that racism, homophobia, xenophobia, genocide denial and actions designed to further these are abhorrent), the case for not inviting these men is that the only reason we are doing so is because they have violated these principles. More fundamentally: it is illogical to discuss the merits of censorship in an area which is out of bounds of our moral principles. Griffin and Irving are not exceptional because they advocate free speech in general, but because they advocate free speech of a particular type: that which promotes the views outlined above. But we have agreed that those views are unacceptable to us [if you disagree then obviously this discussion is wasted], therefore their contribution is irrelevant to the debate.
The sensical question to ask in this context, and the question seemingly begged by the above discussion, is the extent to which the law should be drawn-up so as to coincide with our moral views. That, however, is a question best informed by moral philosophers, law makers and the like. It may also be usefully informed by those who share our moral sentiments but have been censored elsewhere (thereby making us sensitive to the dangers of correlating laws on free speech and morality too closely). It is not a question that can be answered to any degree by those who violate these sentiments.
Equal Respect for Others
There is a final set of arguments for not inviting these men, given the first point that to do so is not infringing on their right to free speech. This is that the dignity of fellow students, citizens and residents of Oxford is violated by the invitation of people who have called for them to be expelled from this country, to be given less rights and in Irving’s case have denied or down-played the atrocities they and their families suffered.
Not only are they demeaned by recognition of these individuals, but their safety is threatened. In a societal context one cannot separate Irving and Griffin from their supporters, who tend to be right-wing extremists prone to violence against minority groups.
Conclusion
It has been shown definitively that calling for the withdrawal of invitations to Griffin and Irving is not an attack on free speech. Therefore the notion that the issue at hand is about the value of free speech is simply a red herring.
Assuming shared moral sentiments on the issues of racism, xenophobia and homophobia amongst others we argue that not only do Griffin and Irving have nothing to contribute to our debate around the bounds of free speech, but that their invitation actively contradicts these principles and our respect for minority groups in the Oxford community. It also tarnishes the image of Oxford University and the principles of tolerance and diversity it holds dear.
It is on this basis that a broad coalition of Oxford students and residents are calling for the Union to withdraw its invitations to Griffin and Irving.
November 26, 2007 at 9:13 pm
Hi Sean,
I have thought through your analysis. It is interesting. But you make many mistakes along the way that show-up the lack of cogency in the overall analysis.
Let’s rehearse the various steps.
First, you state that “saying that an individual should not be invited to the Union and acting upon this is not equivalent to denying them their right to free speech.”
A few remarks: 1) this conclusion is perfectly correct – in fact, it is trite to even try and ‘prove’ it. It is obviously right.
2) HOWEVER … as we say in philosophy – Tu Quoque. In other words, the same accusation you make against those who make the wrong inference can also be lodged against you. It also does not follow from the fact that ‘free speech does not entail a right to a platform’ that ‘the Union is not entitled to invite X or Y.’ So, the (obvious) conclusion you drew above helps neither your opponents (as you point out) NOR DOES IT HELP YOU. So, the score is level at this stage of your analysis, if you will.
Except, it is not really level … because once we acknowledge that an institution has the LIBERTY to decide who to give a platform to, then of course it is up to the Union and Union Members to decide who to give that platform to. Whatever their logic (and I can rehearse that in a follow-up piece if you want), the institutional right is theirs and theirs only. That means that those who protest against how they exercise that right, is overstepping the bounds of common courtesy, at the very least … and quite possibly overstepping the ethical bounds that are created by institutional rights. After all, the Union is not doing anything illegal … so protesting how they exercise their institutional right is both a) rude and b) an attempt to replace the convictions of Union Members with those of the protestors … a decidedly curious example of intolerance/illiberalism, not unlike the BNP!!.
Let’s consider the next step in your analysis, which you claim is the heart of the matter for you.
This excerpt captures the crux of your positive argument:
“Griffin and Irving are not exceptional because they advocate free speech in general, but because they advocate free speech of a particular type: that which promotes the views outlined above. But we have agreed that those views are unacceptable to us [if you disagree then obviously this discussion is wasted], therefore their contribution is irrelevant to the debate.”
Let me first be intellectually and emotionally mature enough to say that this little bit of analysis is quite beautiful, and certainly not unpersuasive. A full, philosophical, treatment of precisely this argument, with Irving, incidentally, as a central case study, is offered by Raymond Gaita in ‘Forms of the Unthinkable’. Your summary of the view is ok. He offers it in greater detail
However, the argument is not, in the final analysis, completely convincing. It rests on 1) an analytic error and 2) a contestable major premise.
The analytic error first: the error is quite simple, actually, and surprising given that you are trying to approach this whole issue with logical finesse. Here it is: from the fact that we might agree that the content of these guys’ views are morally reprehensible it *does not* follow that they are thereby rendered unqualified to talk about free speech nor that we are, or should be, disinterested in what they have to say. You move illegitimately from ‘we despise the content of their views’ to ‘they have no place in a debate on free speech’. Furthermore, EVEN IF their free speech skirmishes were merely incidental to their bigoted-aims, it does not follow that they cannot be invited to reflect on the free speech issue for a free speech forum. You make it seem as if people are incapable of reflecting on, and speaking to, elements of their life that was ‘incidental’. That is obviously not correct.
The contestable premise (and the relevance of Gaita): It is not universally accepted that immoral propositions are ‘beyond the pale’ or so ‘unthinkable’ as to not be fit for public discussion. You make it seem as if everyone has a deep moral intuition that the content of a racist’s or homophobe’s views should not be engaged. I don’t – and I doubt that means I am a self-loathing black gay man. What it does mean is that I am perfectly happy to engage the content of these views, show them to be unsound, protect my opponent’s right to speak and exercise my right to humiliate them with reason, evidence and composure. A lot more intellectual work would need to be offered by you, and others, before I would even be remotely persuaded that immoral views should never be entertained.
Your final cherry-on-top argument is for the following conclusion: “the dignity of fellow students, citizens and residents of Oxford is violated by the invitation of people who have called for them to be expelled from this country.”
This claim is neither the strongest nor the most interesting one you make, so I will only react to it. First, presumably by dignity you mean something like ‘inherent self-worth’. Well, I cannot see how my inherent self-worth, or those of other blacks, Jews and white-liberals, is genuinely at stake here. Help me out to see how I was violated by this invitation – it seems a rhetorical step in your analysis, albeit an almost-effective one. Second, given that many people who belong to the groups whose dignity is at sake – like myself – deny that we feel violated in the least, I struggle to take seriously this claim, just as I also struggled to take seriously the even more fanciful claim –made by others – that my life (let alone my dignity) is in danger when such men are allowed to speak. That’s activism running way ahead of itself.
Finally, a comment I made elsewhere is worth repeating, nothithstanding the indulgence of quoting oneself: “Let me end by saying that, as a black person, I think it is important that we
do not inadvertently let racist bigots end up being the winners. If we paint *ourselves* as hapless victims whose collective experiences of
institutionalised and other forms of racism make us so emotionally and
intellectually weak that we cannot engage them publicly, then we are
perpetuating a crippling sense of victimhood rather than transcending it.”
Eusebius Mckaiser
November 27, 2007 at 12:15 am
Hey Eusebius, thanks for the considered reply.
I’ll focus primarily on points of disagreement, since that’ll make this a little shorter. But first some points of clarification:
1. I agree the point about free speech appears trivial. In my sample of the Oxford student community however it is *precisely* that argument which is being misunderstood (a misunderstanding encouraged by the president and others) and which i believe led to the Union to vote in favour of the event. So practically it is far from trivial.
2. I’m not sure why you make such a major issue about 2) above since i have a line in my comment which says *precisely* that: “Even agreeing that withdrawing the invitations is not equivalent to an attack on free speech, this is not in itself a reason for them to be withdrawn.” So this is no way a flaw in my argument, merely an inflection point.
Now to more substantial disagreements (which again are largely misreadings of my argument):
3. On the rights of the Union: agreed, partially. It does indeed have the right to issue such invitations. Nowhere have i argued that they should be deprived of this right, through legal means or otherwise.
The following conclusion does not follow however: “That means that those who protest against how they exercise that right, is overstepping the bounds of common courtesy, at the very least … and quite possibly overstepping the ethical bounds that are created by institutional rights.” This statement is flawed in a fundamental sense since it runs into the problem Sen noted in his proof on the impossibility of a Paretian liberal. But applying that point in a more specific sense: it is perfectly reasonable that i may have a preference that Griffin and Irving should not be invited to speak at a prestigious platform (private or otherwise) in my town which – whether you like it or not – draws prestige from the university i attend. And by the freedom of speech principles we both hold dear i – and others who agree with me – may express that via blogs or legal protests.
(For fear of being *completely* side-tracked i won’t even begin to engage on what ‘common courtesy’ is or why it should matter in any fundamental sense…!)
4. (Academic note: Not being a philosopher by education I have never heard of Gaita, but i’m glad to hear that at least one aspect of my argument has been acknowledged as meritorious elsewhere.)
I do not claim that Irving and Griffin have nothing to say about free speech *only* because we disagree with their views. The disagreement about views is only one component of the argument and – we agree on this – is not sufficient for the conclusion. Let’s take the example of James Watson who recently had his event in Oxford cancelled. I actually thought it would be perfectly legitimate to have him speak *provided* he spoke to issues on which he is a recognised expert (leaving aside the fact that he and Crick pinched the Nobel from Rosalind Franklin). But if he’d been invited to speak on whether scientists should be given platforms to espouse their bigoted opinions (such as his reported views on the intellectual capacity of black people) on matters which they have no special insight, then i would have opposed it.
Relatedly, neither do i claim that “people are incapable of reflecting on, and speaking to, elements of their life that was ‘incidental’.” My point here is now a *case specific* one, and not generalisable (perhaps i need to explicitly signpost this to avoid such confusions). Take Griffin as the easy example. He is known not to support free speech generally: if you believe people don’t have the right to exist then by implication you deny them the right to free speech. He therefore cannot draw general lessons from his experience for the merits of free speech (without lying). He can only argue for his right to express racial hatred. Well, he would. How does this advance the discussion? If you agree with his views you will concur. If not, you may be undecided but nothing he says about that decision can possibly inform it.
Let me quote an analogy which developed (was proposed to me as a somewhat unfortunate counter-example) in a parallel discussion on this issue:
“If a group that despised homosexuals and believed they were going to burn in hell wanted to discuss whether to tolerate homosexuality or engage in homophobic acts would it help to get a homosexual individual to go and talk to them? Those members who hate him will not be moved either way by his appeals for tolerance, those who do not may be. Now back to the Union. What i said was that *if* we share moral sentiments on racism, anti-semitism and genocide denial then these men cannot inform our discussion about where/if to limit free speech. Of course if people *do not* share those sentiments than they may certainly by influenced by Griffin and Irving’s appeals.”
Of course my definitive statement in the last line of the paragraph above the analogy follows from the hypothetical audience being rational – if they are not then he may indeed inform their views. But if they are not rational then that allows me to make a paternalistic argument for them not being allowed to hear him ‘for their own good’. So one cannot wriggle-out of the conclusion that way.
5. Your mistake is to assume that because i am arguing against Griffin and Irving being invited to speak *on free speech* that i would argue against them speaking *on anything*. “You make it seem as if everyone has a deep moral intuition that the content of a racist’s or homophobe’s views should not be engaged.” Au contraire. I haven’t formulated my view on that as rigorously, but i think a *coherent* case could be made for Griffin to come and participate in a real debate about his views on immigration for instance. (I might oppose his presence anyway, but that would not rely on the logical incoherence of those who invited him – which is the case here). In that case i still think there are good, arguments for not allowing him to speak [in general i think people with inclinations like yours dangerously ignore historical evidence of people's amazing ability to be misled by views that are both dangerous and completely untrue] but that is *not* the case under discussion and *not* what i am arguing in my blog.
6. Hence my ‘rhetorical’ appeal to dignity and safety is as follows: Given (/assuming) that i have demonstrated that there is no coherent reason for inviting these men to talk about free speech, one might still argue that there is some utility the Union members will get from ‘the spectacle’. Certainly, many of them seem sufficiently immature that way.
Okay, but i ask them to consider that outside of the grand walls of the Union both men will use the invitation to garner credence whether that is the intention or not. It is in fact precisely because they are being invited to discuss something *other* than what makes them exceptional (in this case in a negative way) but only *because* of the bigoted views that make them exceptional (note the obvious contradiction here) that i would suggest you as a black, gay man as well as all those who oppose these men’s views should feel offended by the invitation. I would argue you do not feel offended because you don’t appreciate this argument – sorry in advance if you find that patronising but as i’m sure you’ll be the first to acknowledge there is nothing about one’s race/religion/sexual orientation that gives greater access to truth. So ex ante (leaving aside that i know you to be a very intelligent, well-schooled philosopher) it is not inconceivable that you might not be offended precisely for the same reason most Oxford Union members think the invitations are a defence of free speech.
There is indeed nothing absolute in an appeal of this nature – hence the seemingly fuzzy but wholly philosophically coherent appeal to shared principles. If Union members value the spectacle over the negative consequences i outline (and by the way, yes the safety concern is real) then sure, the argument fails. But i like to think they’re made of better stuff than that.
7. The final point (at last!). Your claim that you would defeat these men in debate is hopelessly misplaced. Griffin and Irving will argue for their right to express the views they have. The issue *in the debate* is not the views but the right. If i’m doing you (and Luke Tryll who made the same argument) an injustice and you *do* realise that, then i assume you believe Irving and Griffin should be limited in their right to express certain views. Which partly – though not wholly – is a contradiction on your part. Unless you are going to violate the rules of the debate – but i’m assuming that’s not the case.
Accepting that the problem is them being invited to discuss free speech, no-one is being portrayed as a ‘hapless victim’. No more than saying that i don’t want Griffin here to discuss whether it is better to break someone’s ribs with a jack boot or a metal pipe means i think his racist views cannot be countered – but they won’t be under that particular discussion.
As a brief personal note, the thing that forced me into this comment was my being really disturbed by the fact that the invitation of bigots was being supported by blatantly false arguments such as the free speech one we both agree on. I came across a quote that summarises this well:
“People demand freedom of speech to make up for the freedom of thought, which they avoid.” Søren Aabye Kierkegaard
Sean
November 27, 2007 at 5:30 pm
Sean,
Having read your blog (again) I will not respond in detail because it turns out I largely agree with the arguments of your previous commenter.
However, based on those arguments, I would have to say that my stance is:
1. Were I the OU President, I probably would not have issued the invitation (there are better debaters and better debates to be had).
2. Were I an OU member I would not have voted in favour of the invitation (ditto previous reason).
3. As a non-member, I would not oppose the invitation nor would I protest against it.
4. Neither do I oppose those who protest (peacefully) against it.
5. I do oppose those who protest in such a way as to disrupt the event, because then you do seriously restrict the freedom of the OU.
I think that is a consistent, if complex, moral position to take.
Incidentally, although I like the title of your blog, I doubt there is much chance for things to oxidise in the rarefied atmosphere at the top of the ivory tower (notwithstanding the permanently wet weather)!
andrew.
November 27, 2007 at 10:06 pm
I think that is a consistent position to take. (I hope you agree with the arguments above which are not flawed…) It may imply a lexicographic preference for the Union’s manner of exercising its right to invite people over any consequences that might follow, but so long as that doesn’t bother you then there is no problem.
As for the rarefied air in these parts: well, i suspect it is a little less rarefied on the streets. But then the merits of oxodisation depend very much on the substantive composition of the object in question…
November 28, 2007 at 3:39 pm
i enjoyed your article. i have a further point to make on this. in terms of allowing irving and griffin to debate at the union, it also depends on what kind of role you think the union should play. apparently in these debates fascist speakers often have their arguments torn to pieces, so there could therefore be a strong argument for saying that, if the union is purely for oxford students, allowing them to see how illogical and prejudiced irving’s and griffin’s arguments are is a good thing.
however, what about the attitude of the general public? for the general population who does not attend the debate, they see a prestigious debating society at one of Britain’s oldest universities extending the hand of friendship to the leader of a far-right party and a holocaust denier. This was clearly how Griffin saw things – he described our generation as ‘more sensible’ about things, a questionable accolade when it originates from a BNP spokesman. The public sees Oxford drawing these speakers into the mainstream. The Union can pretty much invite anyone it wants, why choose these two? It seems to be a cynical ploy to create a national furore and publicity for the organisers of the event.
Then you can look at the subject Griffin was asked to talk about. Yes, he has been censored- for racist and prejudiced writings. It is not free speech to express racist views. You exceed your own individual liberty when you deliberately try to cause harm to another person or group of people. The Union haven’t invited Abu Hamza to speak there either; if they are going to take the approach that even if someone condones violent murder they should still have their freedom of expression, perhaps they should. But this type of speaker, for this subject only denegrates the value of ‘free speech.’ I think we need to be careful about whether the union is seen to be condoning the views of its speakers by inviting them. It does suggest a certain level of public acceptance or respect to invite someone to speak there. Irving and Griffin are able to express their views publicly without arrest. But they should not be accorded that respect. Their ideas should not be entertained as in any way sensible or worthy of examination. There should be no debate about whether the holocaust happened. It is an insult to anyone who suffered, and sets a worrying precedent for the future. I would personally warn against drawing either of these figures into the mainstream like this. They should have no platform. If the Union is going to stretch an important principle in this way, why not invite serial killers? Go crazy, and completely destroy the union’s reputation as a forum for serious debate, by all means.
November 28, 2007 at 3:41 pm
sorry, through reading what i have written again, it sounds a little confusing when i write ‘they should not be accorded that respect.’ i do not mean that they should not be able to express their views freely, i mean they should not be invited to respected institutions to do so
November 29, 2007 at 7:21 pm
Something i just came across, the site which reveals the kind of ‘free speech’ the BNP favours: http://www.redwatch.co.uk. No doubt Luke Tryll will find it ‘abhorrent’ but still be prepared to put a link to it on the Oxford Union website?