Nick Griffin and David Irving have been invited to talk at the Oxford Union in a ‘Free Speech Forum’. A number of groups have condemned this, calling for the invitations to be withdrawn. A significant proportion in the Oxford student community believe this to be a direct attack on free speech – the very issue which the debate was to discuss. This piece explains why this latter view is mistaken.
Logic
Let us begin with a simple logical demonstration of this assertion.
- We can agree that not inviting any given individual to speak at the Union is not equivalent to denying them free speech, since under no meaningful definition does free speech imply being able to speak in any possible forum (national television, the G8 summit, the Oxford Union) at one’s choosing.
- By implication, saying that an individual should not be invited to the Union and acting upon this is not equivalent to denying them their right to free speech. QED.
A simple analogy: An individual records a video of himself expressing views on a wide variety of issues . He later gratuitously murders a dozen people. Upon his arrest the video is obtained by media agencies. Is it a violation of his free speech to argue that the video should not be broadcast?
Experience of Censorship
Even agreeing that withdrawing the invitations is not equivalent to an attack on free speech, this is not in itself a reason for them to be withdrawn. The Union president and others have argued that Irving and Griffin have experience of censorship and this means that they will make an important contribution to the debate. It is fundamentally disagreement with this argument that motivates those demanding the withdrawal of the invitations. A formulation of the argument is as follows.
It is true that Griffin and Irving have experience of censorship: Irving was jailed for holocaust denialism in Austria; Griffin has a conviction in Britain for producing a publication that incited racial hatred . In fact, this is the only thing that qualifies both Irving and Griffin to talk about free speech. From their point of view the fact that this has led to their censorship is simply incidental. It should not be merely incidental for us however.
Assuming that we can agree on certain moral principles (that racism, homophobia, xenophobia, genocide denial and actions designed to further these are abhorrent), the case for not inviting these men is that the only reason we are doing so is because they have violated these principles. More fundamentally: it is illogical to discuss the merits of censorship in an area which is out of bounds of our moral principles. Griffin and Irving are not exceptional because they advocate free speech in general, but because they advocate free speech of a particular type: that which promotes the views outlined above. But we have agreed that those views are unacceptable to us [if you disagree then obviously this discussion is wasted], therefore their contribution is irrelevant to the debate.
The sensical question to ask in this context, and the question seemingly begged by the above discussion, is the extent to which the law should be drawn-up so as to coincide with our moral views. That, however, is a question best informed by moral philosophers, law makers and the like. It may also be usefully informed by those who share our moral sentiments but have been censored elsewhere (thereby making us sensitive to the dangers of correlating laws on free speech and morality too closely). It is not a question that can be answered to any degree by those who violate these sentiments.
Equal Respect for Others
There is a final set of arguments for not inviting these men, given the first point that to do so is not infringing on their right to free speech. This is that the dignity of fellow students, citizens and residents of Oxford is violated by the invitation of people who have called for them to be expelled from this country, to be given less rights and in Irving’s case have denied or down-played the atrocities they and their families suffered.
Not only are they demeaned by recognition of these individuals, but their safety is threatened. In a societal context one cannot separate Irving and Griffin from their supporters, who tend to be right-wing extremists prone to violence against minority groups.
Conclusion
It has been shown definitively that calling for the withdrawal of invitations to Griffin and Irving is not an attack on free speech. Therefore the notion that the issue at hand is about the value of free speech is simply a red herring.
Assuming shared moral sentiments on the issues of racism, xenophobia and homophobia amongst others we argue that not only do Griffin and Irving have nothing to contribute to our debate around the bounds of free speech, but that their invitation actively contradicts these principles and our respect for minority groups in the Oxford community. It also tarnishes the image of Oxford University and the principles of tolerance and diversity it holds dear.
It is on this basis that a broad coalition of Oxford students and residents are calling for the Union to withdraw its invitations to Griffin and Irving.
